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New Hazardous Waste Law-P.A.
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INTRODUCTION
Background
In response to a growing awareness of the dangers associated with the
disposal of hazardous wastes, legislation has been passed in recent years.
A legislative milestone was the passage of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976, part of which addressed the need to
control hazardous wastes from "cradle to grave."' Subtitle C of RCRA
required the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to
formulate specific regulations which would serve as guidelines by specifying the minimum requirements necessary for a state plant to gain the
approval of the USEPA. Consequently, the states and the appropriate state
agencies charged with formulating the hazardous waste regulations may
impose stricter requirements for generators, transporters and disposers of
hazardous wastes.
There has been a growing trend among states to enact laws targeted at
the problems associated with the landfill disposal of hazardous wastes
which go beyond the requirements of RCRA. Included in this group are
Illinois, Missouri, Massachusetts, California, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 2
While the wording varies from statute to statute in each of these states,
the primary purpose of the states' legislation is consistently one of re*Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Illinois State University.
**Assistant Professor, Institute for Environmental Studies, and the Department of Agricultural
Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
***Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Mlhe authors wish to thank Roger Findley for his useful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper. This analysis was funded under a grant from the Research Board of the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign.
1. 42 U.S.C. §6901-6987 (1982).
2. The specific statute in each state is: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 1039 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984), as amended by P.A. 82-572; Missouri Hazardous Waste Management Law, MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.350-430 (Vernon Supp. 1984); Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Act of 1979, as amended,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31c, §§ 1-14 (West 1981); Hazardous Waste Control Law of 1973,
as amended, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25105 (WEST 1984); KY. REV. STAT.
§§ 224.830-.864 (1983); Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1975, as amended, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-46-101 to -117 (Supp. 1983).
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stricting and eventually eliminating, as much as is reasonably possible,
the landfill disposal of hazardous wastes. 3
Illinois and Missouri are representative of the more restrictive attitude
toward landfilling of hazardous wastes. Both states have effectively banned
the landfill disposal of hazardous wastes unless it can be shown that
considerations of technological feasibility and economic reasonableness
preclude the use of alternative disposal methods. 4 Several important issues
arise when consideration is given to the possible economic effects of such
statutory requirements. Among these issues are: (1) the legislative intent
in the use and interpretation of phrases such as "economic reasonableness" when it is employed in promulgating regulations designed to achieve
the desired goal of the statute; (2) the theoretical factors which should
be considered when interpreting and applying the phrase "economic reasonableness"; (3) the possible implications for interstate disposal and,
consequently, the general level of production of hazardous wastes; and
(4) the level of efficiency in hazardous waste control that can be expected
to prevail.
This paper focuses on the theoretical and legal interpretations of "economic reasonableness." The question of how courts have reviewed administrative agency actions involving consideration of "economic
reasonableness" is examined focusing on case law in Illinois. It has been
assumed that Illinois is representative of states actively involved in legislation of hazardous wastes and that judicial review of administrative
decisions in Illinois is a good indicator of how judicial review generally
proceeds in other states. 5 The conclusions of both the theoretical model
and the examination of the judicial review process may be extended to
situations in states other than Illinois.
Illinois and PublicAct 82-572
Illinois, like most other states, has chosen to adopt by reference the
3. For the specific wording of ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 1039 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984)
see infra text accompanying note 7. MO. STAT. ANN. § 260.370 (Vernon Supp. 1984) states:
[wihere proven technology is available with respect to a specific hazardous waste and
the economic impact is reasonable, pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the
commission, the hazardous waste management commission shall direct that disposal of
the specific hazardous wastes using landfilling as the primary method is prohibited.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21c, § 7 requires that "[h]azardous wastes shall be disposed of in
a landfill only .. .(b) where the department finds that said hazardous waste cannot be recycled,
destroyed, or disposed of by some other means approved by the department pursuant to its rules,
regulations, procedures or standards." The remaining laws referred to in note 2, supra, place a
similar emphasis on the need to move away from the landfill disposal of hazardous wastes via
encouragement of the use of alternatives and varying restrictions on the use of landfills for the
disposal of hazardous wastes.
4. For Missouri, see supra note 3. For Illinois, see infra text accompanying note 7.
5. F. E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 250-63 (1965).
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regulations formulated by the USEPA and has revised them in accordance
with changes the USEPA incorporates into its own body of existing regulations. 6 In early 1982, however, Illinois went beyond the requirements
of RCRA and existing regulations by enacting Public Act 82-572 (Illinois
Waste Law) which will severely restrict the landfill disposal of most
hazardous wastes:
Commencing January 1, 1987, a hazardous waste stream may not
be deposited in a permitted hazardous waste site unless specific
authorization is obtained from the [Illinois Environmental Protection]
Agency by the generator and the disposal site owner and operator
for the deposit of that specific waste stream. The Agency may grant
specific authorization for disposal of hazardous waste streams only
after the generator has reasonably demonstrated that, considering
technical feasibility and economic reasonableness, the hazardous waste
stream cannot be reasonably recycled for reuse, incinerated, or chemically, physically, or biologically treated so as to neutralize the hazardous waste and render it nonhazardous. .
Note that the law empowers the agency to proceed not by defining statewide standards for hazardous waste disposal but rather by defining these
standards on a generator-by-generatorbasis.
Implementation of the Illinois Waste Law will depend, inter alia, upon
interpretation of the phrase "economic reasonableness." The language of
the statute places the initial burden of proof as to the nonexistence of
alternatives to landfill disposal of a particular waste stream on the generator of that waste, but it will be up to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) to determine whether the generator's arguments
concerning "technical feasibility and economic reasonableness" are sufficient. The IEPA will either have already determined the general meaning
of "economic reasonableness" or else deal with that determination on a
case-by-case basis. If the IEPA refuses the generator's request to landfill
the waste, the generator can then appeal to the Illinois Pollution Control
Board (PCB) and, in the event that the PCB upholds the IEPA's decision
against the waste generator, take the case to the appellate court.
Underlying Assumptions
Given that the Illinois Waste Law is scheduled for implementation in
January 1987, any assumptions about how industry and environmental
groups will react to it are only speculative. However, it is probably a
safe assumption that at some point this law will be brought under the
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 1022.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) as amended by P.A. 82380 (1981).
7. Id. 11039 as amended by P.A. 82-572 (1981).
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scrutiny of the courts. A case may arise because of noncompliance on
the part of a generator. Alternatively, waste generators or disposers may
appeal adverse IEPA and PCB rulings, forcing the courts to define the
limits of the law and the meaning of "economic reasonableness." Finally,
an environmental group may initiate legal action against a particular
generator or disposer whom they feel to be in violation of the law. In
any case, the final result would be a judicial review of the law.
A second assumption is that the court will have three distinct options
in reviewing the legislative meaning and IEPA and PCB interpretations
of "economic reasonableness." First, the court may offer its own interpretation, independent of previous decisions on the subject and instead,
based upon the judges' own understanding and perceptions influenced by
testimony given during the proceedings. Secondly, the court may rely on
recent case law which has dealt with the question of "economic reasonableness." Finally, in reviewing a particular case brought before the court,
the court may choose, or be bound by the constraints of judicial review,
to evaluate the facts as they pertain to the rulemaking procedure. Judicial
deference would be given to the agency's interpretation of "economic
reasonableness" and the court would ascertain whether the agency's decision was reached in an arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unreasonable manner.8 With this standard of judicial review, and in the absence
of a finding of arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable behavior,
it is presumed that the agency's decision would be upheld.
Finally, a word is in order regarding how the IEPA will implement the
requirements of the Illinois Waste Law. The IEPA may authorize the
landfill disposal of hazardous wastes, considering economic reasonableness and technical feasibility, only if the generator can show that no
alternatives exist. We will assume that the IEPA will promulgate regulations directing the generator how to establish that no alternatives exist
in fact. Such action on the part of IEPA is of sufficient likelihood as to
justify the assumption.
The remainder of this paper examines the implications for economic
efficiency in the disposal of hazardous wastes which stem from various
interpretations of the phrase "economic reasonableness." Part II sets out
the criteria necessary to determine the meaning of "economic reasonableness" which would be consistent with maximizing efficiency, from
a social perspective, of the disposal of hazardous wastes. Consideration
is given to both private and social costs and benefits associated with the
various disposal alternatives. Part III involves an examination of case
law in Illinois which identifies the dominant legal approach to reviewing
an agency's interpretation of the phrase "economic reasonableness." The
8. See infra text accompanying note 27.
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purpose is to see if the judicial approach conforms to the theoretical
standards developed in Part II.
II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF "ECONOMIC REASONABLENESS"
Alternative Interpretationsof "Economic Reasonableness"
Since courts and administrative agencies are responsible for interpreting
and applying existing law, both groups will identify the legislative intent
behind the wording in a given statute. It is important to note that all three
groups involved in the legal process-legislators, administrators, and
judges-take into account a broad range of concerns of which economic
efficiency is only one. Economic efficiency is not the only relevant consideration in the interpretation and application of a given statute but it is
of obvious importance when reviewing judicial interpretations of phrases
such as "economic reasonableness."
There is a spectrum of interpretations of "economic reasonableness"
in the context of the Illinois Waste Law. It is useful to analyze the
interpretations that occupy the two extreme ends of this spectrum on a
generator-by-generator basis--economic efficiency and affordability.
Economic efficiency focuses on the individual generator and takes into
account the social costs and benefits of prohibiting landfilling of a particular waste. Affordability looks only at the change in the financial
position of the generator when landfilling of a given waste is not allowed.
In this section we shall explore these two interpretations and their likely
impact on the landfilling of hazardous wastes under the Illinois Waste
Law. Before analyzing these interpretations, it will be useful to consider
what the socially optimal level of landfilling a particular hazardous waste
might be by using a statewide standard rather than the generator-bygenerator basis mandated by the Illinois Waste Law. A statewide standard
will provide a bench mark to analytically compare the outcome of either
economic efficiency or affordability, both on a generator-by-generator
basis.
The Socially Optimal Level of Landfilling of a Given HazardousWaste
For simplicity in determining the socially optimal level of landfilling
for a single hazardous waste, it will be assumed that the waste is generated
in the production of a single good" which is bought and sold in a perfectly
9. Recall that the Illinois Waste Law is designed to be applied specifically on generator-bygenerator basis. See supra text accompanying note 7.
10. Relaxation of the assumption of a single waste being generated in the production of a single
good will not affect the conclusions drawn in the following analysis. Retention of the assumption
greatly reduces the complexity of the analysis.
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competitive market." Determination of the socially optimal level of landfilling depends upon the welfare changes which result when some or all
of the firms producing the good are not permitted to landfill the resulting
waste. Welfare changes are equal to the difference between social costs
and benefits. The social cost in this case is the loss in social welfare to
both firms and consumers of their product from not landfilling the waste.
This welfare loss arises from the increased cost of waste disposal incurred2
by switching from landfilling to the next least costly method of disposal.'
The total welfare loss can be ascertained by analysis of the market for
the good whose production results in the generation of the hazardous
waste. The analysis of the welfare loss or social cost can be shown visually
with the aid of Figure 1. The curves So and D represent the supply and
demand for the good whose production entails the generation of the
hazardous waste. If producers are required to use some disposal method
other than landfilling, their variable costs will increase. This is reflected
in Figure 1 by the rotation of the supply curve from So to S1.' The change
in the supply curve will result in an increased price of Pl and a reduction
in output to Q1. The social cost to producers of these changes is given
by the change in producers' surplus.' 4 This surplus is defined as the area
above the supply curve but below the horizontal price line and represents
the difference between producers' total revenues and total variable costs.
Thus, originally producers' surplus was given by the area e +f+ g in
Figure 1. After the shift of some or all the firms from landfilling, the
producer's surplus has been reduced to the area b + e in the figure. The
change in producers' welfare is simply the difference between these two
areas or b - (f+ g).
We can calculate that part of the social cost relating to the welfare loss
by consumers of the product, which is associated with generation of the
hazardous waste, in a similar manner. The effect on consumers' welfare
from a change in hazardous waste disposal methods is simply the difference between consumers' welfare before and after the change. This difference in welfare can be measured using the concept of consumers'
surplus. Consumers' surplus is defined as the area above the price line
and below the demand curve" and represents consumers' excess willing11. Essentially, the assumption of perfect competition means that both buyers and sellers in the
market are price takers, i.e., single individuals in either group cannot influence price.
12. Following normal practice in economic analysis, it is assumed that producers/generators are
currently disposing of their hazardous waste in the least cost method of disposal, landfilling.
13. For a competitive industry, the industry supply curve is simply the summation of the individual
firm's marginal cost curves. See R.JUST, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY, 52-3 (1982).
14. Id. at 55-57.
15. This area represents the difference between what consumers would be willing to pay (as
represented by the demand curve) and what they actually pay in the market place. A change in
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FIGURE 1. Supply and demand for a good whose production generates a
hazardous waste.
ness to pay for the quantity of the good being exchanged, i.e., the difference between the maximum amount that consumers would be willing
to pay for the quantity exchanged and the total amount actually paid. It
is therefore equivalent to the extra value consumers place on the good
that is realized but not paid for. Prior to the change in the price, consumers'
surplus in Figure 1 was given by the area a + b + c + d. After the price
change it is simply the area a. Therefore, the change in consumers' surplus
is the difference in these areas or the area b + c + d. This is the amount
by which consumers' excess benefits from purchasing the good have
decreased.
consumer's surplus will equal the welfare loss or social cost to consumers only if the price change
is small or the portion of disposable income spent on the item is small. See Willig, Consumer's
Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 589 (1976).
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Total social costs associated with the shifting of some or all firms from
landfilling their wastes is given by summing the changes in producers'
and consumers' surplus. Total social costs for the industry pictured in
Figure 1 are given by the area - (f+ g + c + d). The social costs of firms
switching from landfilling to some other disposal method for a given
hazardous waste can be assessed in the market for that product but the
social benefits occur outside of markets. The benefits to society from a
move away from landfilling are the reduction in risk to the environment
and human health. 6 Landfilling of a hazardous waste entails the risk that
waste might migrate from the disposal site and contaminate the surrounding environment. The magnitude of this risk will be a function of several
factors: the structural and functional integrity of the landfill liner, cap,
and leachate collection system; the degree of persistence and hazard
associated with the waste; the potential for detrimental interactions between other wastes and the waste in question, or between other wastes
and the integrity of the landfill; 7 and the placement of the landfill within
a broader geographic and geologic setting.' 8
Determination of the social benefits from one or more generators of a
hazardous waste switching to another disposal technology requires an
understanding of the risks associated with the various disposal alternatives
and the value that society places on the resulting changes in risk. Currently, potential alternatives to landfilling a hazardous waste include recycling, biological treatment, chemical treatment and incineration. Since
risk is couched in terms of the threat to the environment and to human
health, the following assumptions concerning the risk associated with the
alternative disposal technologies will be made. First, the risk associated
with a given disposal method is directly proportional to the amount of
residue that remains after treatment that must be landfilled.' 9 All of the
16. It is risk reduction that society is concerned with because the failure of a landfill is not a
certainty and, even if a landfill did fail, it is not certain that it would result in detrimental environmental
or human health effects.
17. For example, some organics increase the permeability of the clay soils used as liners in some
landfills and decrease the time necessary for wastes to leach out of a landfill site. See Anderson,
Brown, and Green, Effect of Organic Fluids on the Permeability of Clay Soil Liners, in Land
Disposal of Hazardous Waste Proceedings of the 8th Annual Research Symposium on the Land
Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, Ft. Mitchell, Ky. (1982) (EPA 600/9 82-002, EPA Municipal Research
Laboratory, Cincinnati).
18. This last factor is concerned with such items as the proximity of the landfill to aquifers or
bodies of surface water, and the type and characteristics of the soils surrounding the landfill site.
19. The risk to the environment and human health from the disposal of hazardous wastes arises
from the potential for exposure to the hazard. Since the alternative disposal methods render some
portion or all of the waste nonhazardous, the risk of exposure is reduced in comparison to landfilling.
For example, incineration of hazardous wastes requires that 99.99% of all the hazards associated
with a waste be destroyed during the incineration process. Thus the only risks to the environment
and human health are the 0.01% of the material that potentially leaves the stack and the ash that
remains after disposal.
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FIGURE 2. The marginal social costs and benefits from the reduction of risk
associated with the landfilling of a hazardous waste.

alternative disposal methods have a lower risk associated with them than
landfilling because of the reduction in quantity of the residue needing to
be landfilled. Secondly, all of the above alternative disposal methods have
different risks associated with them.
The value or benefit of the risk reduction to society as generators shift
to one or more of these disposal alternatives is, from an economic viewpoint, society's willingness to pay for the marginal risk reduction." Let
us assume that as the risk associated with disposal of a given hazardous
waste decreases, society's benefits, as measured by willingness to pay,
also decrease (i.e., the demand curve for risk reduction is downward
sloping). The marginal social benefit associated with risk reduction can
be represented by the curve labeled MSB in Figure 2.
The marginal social costs of achieving different levels of risk reduction
can be shown by the curve labeled MSC. The MSC curve is upward sloped
on the assumption that, as risks are reduced, total social costs, as measured
20. Note that each individual may place a different value on changes in risk, and therefore the
appropriate measure for society's valuation of a specific level of risk reduction would be the summation of the individual's willingness to pay for that reduction. Brookshire, Ives, & Schulze, The
Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 325 (1976).
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by the losses in producers' and consumers' surplus, increase at an increasing rate as more firms are required to abandon landfilling their hazardous wastes and forced to resort to more costly disposal techniques.
The socially optimal level of risk reduction from the prohibition of some
or all of the firms from the landfilling of a given hazardous waste occurs
where the marginal social benefits from risk reduction equal the marginal
social costs of that reduction, indicated by r* in Figure 2. From an
economic efficiency viewpoint, society would not stop at a level of risk
reduction lower than r*, for example r' in Figure 2, because the benefits
of moving from r' to r* outweigh the costs. Similarly, society would not
reduce risks beyond r* to r2 in Figure 2 because the costs of such an
action would outweigh the benefits. Once the socially optimal level of
risk reduction is known, the amount of a hazardous waste that can be
landfilled can be determined.
The topic of the socially optimal level of risk from hazardous waste
landfilling and associated policies has not been extensively discussed in
the economic literature. However, there is a large body of this literature
that has dealt with the achievement of the socially optimal level of other
environmental hazards such as air and water pollution, toxic substances,
and safe drinking water.2' The general conclusion that can be drawn is
that the determination and attainment of the social optimum requires a
global focus. It is important to note, however, that the Illinois Waste Law
restricts the focus of policy to the firm level by requiring a generator-bygenerator level of analysis and may, therefore, make the attainment of
the social optimum unlikely.
An Economic Analysis of an Economic Efficiency at the Firm Level
and an Affordability Interpretationof "Economic Reasonableness"
The Illinois Waste Law requires that the landfill disposal of a hazardous
waste be determined on a case-by-case (i.e., generator-by-generator) basis. Evaluation of "economic reasonableness" using an economic efficiency analysis at the individual generator level will result in a different
outcome than that associated with the above analysis of the social optimum. The effect of this change in viewpoint is twofold: (1) reduction of
the social costs associated with forcing the firm to undertake a different
method of disposal will occur; and (2) the granting of a variance for
landfilling of the waste will depend on preceding decisions regarding
variances for other generators.
The effect on social costs can be seen in Figure 3. In a competitive
industry the demand curve for the product as seen by a firm is perfectly
21. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE
QUALITY OF LIFE, chs. 14-23 (1979).
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FIGURE 3. Supply and demand at the firm level for a good whose production
generates a hazardous waste.
flat.22 Thus, the social costs associated with a change in disposal method
would only be the change in the single firm's producer's surplus and
would not include the aggregate effects on consumers' surplus when many
or all of the firms in an industry are required to adopt alternative disposal
methods. Consequently, changing the analysis from the industry to a caseby-case level results in the underestimation of the marginal social costs.
The marginal social benefits from denying a firm's request to landfill their
wastes, moreover, will now depend on whether other generators' requests
to landfill their wastes have been previously denied. If other firms' requests for variances have preceded that of the firm under analysis and
these requests have been denied then, assuming declining marginal benefits of risk reduction, the marginal benefits associated with denying this
latter firm's request to landfill are lower. If enough firms have preceded
the one under analysis, then the variance might be granted. This last
result may be inefficient because it may allow a firm to landfill a hazardous
waste where that particular firm is more efficient than the other firms in
22. In a perfectly competitive market the firms are all price takers and as such face a perfectly
flat demand curve at the market price.
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the industry at disposing of the waste by some means other than landfilling.23
Evaluation of "economic reasonableness" using affordability as the
primary decision criterion also will result in a different outcome than that
associated with the social optimum. Use of this interpretation of "economic reasonableness" requires that the only factors to be taken into
account when deciding to allow a firm to landfill a hazardous waste are
the firm's costs, or producer's surplus, shown as the area above the firm's
supply curve and below the price in Figure 3. The loss in consumers'
surplus from the increased costs of disposal are not taken into account
nor are the social benefits arising from not allowing the waste to be
landfilled.
From the above analysis it is clear that neither of the two interpretations
of "economic reasonableness"--economic efficiency on a generator-bygenerator basis or affordability-results in the socially optimal level of
landfilling of a hazardous waste. The interpretation that most closely
approaches the social optimum is the economic efficiency interpretation
because it disregards fewer social costs and benefits. An additional risk
of inefficiency is associated with both interpretations because it is conceivable that under either of these two interpretations a waste that should
not be landfilled at all may be landfilled. This would occur if the cost of
not landfilling the waste was very large which might require the discontinuance of production of the product generating the waste. The decision
whether to allow any landfilling of a waste or not can only be consistently
made by an analysis of the social optimum and this decision cannot be
made on a generator-by-generator basis.
III. LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
"ECONOMIC REASONABLENESS"
Introduction
In this section we shall focus on Illinois' attempts to implement the
economic reasonableness criterion. 4 We shall see if the administrative
agencies (Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the Pol23. For economic efficiency reasons one would want the firms that could most efficiently dispose
of the hazardous waste by some other means than landfilling not to receive permission to landfill.
On the other hand, firms that are inefficient at any other means of disposal should receive permission
to landfill, if this is to be granted at all.
24. We shall leave aside, again, the issue of how best to create the proper incentives for those
creating hazardous wastes, landfill operators, government regulators, the courts, and others to dispose
of hazardous wastes in a socially optimal fashion. For a discussion of this topic in other areas of
environmental policies, see W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1979), and J. Lon Carlson, The Law and Economics of
Hazardous Waste Landfill Disposal: A Framework for Analysis (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
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lution Control Board (PCB)) and the courts have interpreted and applied
the economic reasonableness criterion as we have suggested that the
criterion should be interpreted and applied. In reviewing the actions of
an administrative agency a court may distinguish binding, previous decisions, or the court may be rigidly bound by precedent.' The first option
is clearly beyond the pale in Anglo-American law, while the second is
closer to the norm. Another option falls somewhere between the previous
two and is clearly much closer to the option of being rigidly bound by
precedent. This third option grants judicial deference to the administrative
agency's ruling unless the procedure for reaching the ruling is found to
be arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable.26 The emphasis on
procedure means that the courts will not inquire into the substance of an
agency's rulings if the agency has not obviously strayed beyond its constitutionally-imposed boundaries.27 The courts generally defer to the administrative agency on questions of fact and reserve the power to overturn
agencies' decisions for those instances where there is a question of law
at issue.2"
While this deferential view is the norm in Illinois and every other
jurisdiction in the country, it is not without critics. For example, the
former chairman of the Illinois Pollution Control Board has written,
"Judicial review [of the PCB's decisions] has been uneven, sometimes
interfering excessively with the Board's exercise of judgment and at other
times deferring too uncritically."'29 The same observation was offered
about the Illinois courts' interpretation of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. 0
Our point in turning to the cases dealing with the judicial interpretation
of the pollution statutes is to derive some feeling for whether the agencies
or the courts have adopted or are likely to adopt the sort of interpretation
of the current statutes and the concept of economic reasonableness which
we have urged upon policymakers in the previous section. For the purposes of review we shall look only at several leading appellate decisions
and not at the underlying agency rulings. The cases to be considered are
Illinois Coal Operators'Association v. Pollution Control Board (1974)"';
Commonwealth Edison Company v. Pollution Control Board (1974)32 and
25. See supra text accompanying note 8.
26. This is the approach that has been adopted in Illinois courts when reviewing administrative
actions where a question of fact is at issue. See infra text accompanying note 36.
27. Courts grant a similar deference to legislative actions. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, at 525-56 (3d ed. 1972).
28. Id. See also I. F. COOPER, supra note 5.
29. Currie, Enforcement Under the Illinois PollutionLaw, 70 NW. U.L. REV. 389, 485 (1975).
30. Curie, Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 501 (1975).
31. 59 I11.
2d 305, 319 N.E.2d 782 (1974).
32. 25 I11. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (1974), modified, 62111. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459 (1976).
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(1976)"3; and Shell Oil Company v. Pollution Control Board (1976). 4
None of these cases deal with the problems of hazardous waste disposal.
They are, however, attempts to construe the same sort of economic reasonableness issue which arises in the Illinois Waste Law. The cases,
moreover, deal with pollution standards defined on a statewide basis,
rather than a generator-by-generator basis as in the case with the Illinois
Waste Law. Note that the use of statewide standards, as in the earlier
pollution cases, in general, will not achieve the social optimum.35 However, the courts seem to be unwilling to question whatever standard is
employed by the administrative agency. We find it to be probable that
the courts will also defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of
the Illinois Waste Law instead of urging the agency to adopt a statewide
standard. Thus, the lesson we derive from this examination of the cases
is that the courts in Illinois will not actively change the agency's implementation of the law.
Examination of the Cases
The first important case in Illinois to interpret the new environmental
statute was Illinois Coal Operators'Association v. PollutionControlBoard.36
The Coal Operators' Association claimed that, among other things, the
noise emission regulations promulgated in 1973 by the Pollution Control
Board were arbitrary. Relying on its holdings in other cases in which
substantive administrative agency rules were challenged, the Illinois Supreme Court said that "administrative action taken under statutory authority will not be set aside unless it has been clearly arbitrary, unreasonable,
or capricious. "37 The court concluded that the actions of the PCB in
drawing up the noise emission standards could not be characterized as
arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. The PCB had, through the Illinois
Institute for Environmental Quality, named a Task Force on Noise. The
Task Force had included faculty from the University of Illinois law,
engineering, and physiology units and the services of a national acoustical
accounting firm. After receiving its report, the PCB then held 16 public
hearings before considering and issuing its rulings in July, 1973.38 While
one might reasonably disagree with the resultant ruling from the PCB, it
is hard to imagine that the procedural aspects of their deliberations could
have been more satisfactory. The case, although not of particular note in
33. 62 I11.
2d 494, 343 N.E. 459 (1976).
34. 37 Ill.
App. 3d 264, 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976).
35. While the use of statewide standards constitutes an improvement over the generator-bygenerator approach, it nonetheless fails to take account of the effects on disposal in other states and
hence the effects on social welfare at the national level.
36. 59 Ill.
2d 305, 319 N.E.2d 782 (1974).
37. Id. at 310, 319 N.E.2d at 785.
38. Id. at 307.
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any other regard, is important because the rule of judicial deference was
applied to the new environmental regulatory statute.
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Board39 the PCB
adopted regulations in 1972 which set ambient air quality standards for
coal-burning power plants." The power company asserted that the posting
of a bond required to obtain a permit to burn coal was an "unauthorized
legislative penalty, unlawful delegation of legislative authority, and illegal
usurpation of judicial powers ...."4 The second issue on appeal is more
to the point of this article. The utility company contended that the Board
had not complied with section 27 of the Environmental Protection Act,42
which required the PCB to establish technical feasibility and economic
reasonableness criteria for the ambient air quality standards. Commonwealth Edison also claimed that the vast majority of public utilities in
the state would be unable to meet the ambient air quality standards by
the date specified by the PCB.43
The Court in Commonwealth Edison referred to the prevailing standard
of judicial deference to administrative rulings on matters of fact. The
court said that the questions of technical feasibility and economic reasonableness were factual matters and the court would defer to the PCB's
expertise." 4 "[A] regulation need not be supported by substantial evidence;
rather it will be deemed valid unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, or otherwise not in accord with the law."4 5 Despite this
hat-tipping to the entrenched view of judicial deference on questions of
substance, the court then proceeded to take the PCB to task for not having
conducted its proceedings with enough diligence on the issues of technical
feasibility and economic reasonableness. In particular, the court urged
the PCB to establish clearer guidelines. "[T]here must be some factors
to which the Board [PCB] can point to show that its projection [of the
effect of its proposed rules on utilities and the environment] was reasonable and capable of compliance by a substantial number of the individual
units of this state. Such evidence is absent in the present record." 46 The
court held that the Board had not taken into proper account the technical
feasibility of its rules.
We further hold that there is no evidence that the Board took into
account the economic reasonableness of these rules for a substantial
number of the generating units in this state. The testimony at the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

25 I11. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (1974).
Id. at 273, 323 N.E.2d at 86.
Id.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, 1027 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984).
25 Il1. App. 3d at 284, 323 N.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 278, 323 N.E.2d at 90.
2d 305, 319 N.E.2d 782.
Id. citing Illinois Coal Operators' Ass'n 59 Ill.
25 11. App. 3d at 282, 323 N.E.2d at 95.
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hearings indicated the cost of the sulfur removal systems would be
great. Rather than presenting a formula indicating a balance between
cost and pollution control or giving some concrete cost projections,
the Board in its opinion offered general statements that there must
be a "balancing [of] the benefits of the contemplated rule against its
costs," and that greater costs may be needed to be absorbed "when
the need for pollution abatement is greater." 47
The court was caught between its duty to defer to the agency on
substantive matters as enunciated in Illinois Coal Operators'Association
and the desire to reach out beyond mere procedural issues. The line
between substance and procedure can be a fine one, and the court's opinion
in Commonwealth Edison illustrates the difficulty in locating that line.
The court agreed that it was limited to examining the matters of technical
feasibility and economic reasonableness only for procedural correctness.
Thus, when the court found the ambient air quality standards to be void,
it was bound to do so on the basis of the shortcomings of the PCB's
procedure for determining technical feasibility and economic reasonableness. And yet the court discussed the Board's failure to consider the
impact of the Board's ruling on a substantial number of affected units in
the state. Precisely the same conclusion could have been reached if the
court had never said a word about the procedures used by the Board. The
court might just as well have said that the Board had underestimated the
costs of the proposed standards by treating all utilities as if they lay on
a featureless plain equi-distant from all consumers and suppliers of inputs.
A conclusion based on that criticism would surely have been construed
as one which delved into the substance of the agency's rulings and not
one which confined itself to the procedural aspects of the ruling.48
The Illinois Supreme Court heard the Commonwealth Edison case on
appeal two years later.49 The events of those intervening years allowed
the court to have its cake and to eat it, too. The PCB had undertaken
extensive additional hearings on the effects of the proposed ambient air
quality standards and presumably on the basis of the new findings had
47. Id.
48. This is precisely the court's complaint of the Commonwealth Edison opinion in Shell Oil Co.
v. Pollution ControlBoard, 37111. App. 3d 264, 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976). See infra text accompanying
note 59. Professor Currie points out the possible shortcoming of this view of the court's actions in
his comment on Commonwealth Edison:
The court's conclusion . . . was surely hyperbole ....
Having written the Board's
opinion, I cannot claim objectivity; but I would have thought that the exercise of
judgment on such questions of policy was precisely what the Board was for and that
the court essentially substituted its judgment for that of the Board on a highly debatable
matter.
Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 501, 503 (1975).
49. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 62 Ill. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459
(1976).
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granted Commonwealth a conditional variance." Thus, the court was able
to reaffirm its judicial deference to administrative actions after the court
system had goaded the PCB into revising its procedural inquiries relevant
to technical feasibility and economic reasonableness of the pollution standards. Commonwealth Edison was even allowed a token of victory because it was granted a conditional variance from the proposed standards. 5 '
The final case is a reversion away from the interesting, if paradoxical,
possibilities glanced in Commonwealth Edison. Shell Oil Company v.
Pollution ControlBoard52 is a strongly worded reaffirmation of the judicial
deference enunciated in Illinois Coal Operators'Association.53
Regulations establishing permissible levels of sound emissions from
stationary sources were challenged in Shell Oil. The court upheld the
PCB's ruling and took the opportunity to make clear that courts in Illinois
should not substitute their own judgment for that of administrative agencies.
Because the courts lack the expertise possessed by administrative
agencies, they should hesitate to find a regulation unreasonable....
In our opinion, the Board did have sufficient data before it to show
that it did take into account the technical feasibility and economic
reasonableness of the noise regulations. Accordingly, the disputed
noise regulations adopted by the Illinois Pollution Control Board are
affirmed."
The court said that its duty was neither to substitute its judgment nor
even to specify what the PCB should consider when conducting its studies
of technical feasibility and economic reasonableness. The court refused
to say whether the PCB should conduct a full study or merely take into
account certain factors.5 5 Instead, the Shell Oil court favored giving the
PCB wide discretion in carrying out its mandate in section 27. The court
reasoned that limiting the PCB's deliberations to a consideration of the
technical feasibility and economic reasonableness of currently available
techniques of compliance would hamstring the PCB's ability to force the
adoption of new technologies.
The suggestion that the Board, in order to adopt a rule establishing
certain emission standards, must produce direct evidence that the
control technologies necessary to meet those standards are technically
feasible and economically reasonable for a substantial number of the
50. Id. at 503, 343 N.E.2d at 466.
51. Id.
52. 37 I11.App. 3d 264, 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976).
53. Shell Oil involved precisely the same sort of regulation which was in dispute in Illinois Coal
Operators'Ass'n.
54. 37 Ill. App. 3d at 270, 272, 346 N.E.2d at 218, 222.
55. Id. at 273, 346 N.E.2d at 221.
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sources throughout the state, would necessarily limit the Board's
regulations to a contemplation of existing technology only. This
interpretation is unreasonable and contrary to the stated policy of the
Act.
56

There can be little doubt that this is a mistaken view. There is nothing
at all to prevent the Board from considering anticipated technological
capabilities as well as currently known technology when making its calculations. The socially optimal standard, moreover, which we have proposed in the previous section is independent of the state of technology.
If there is no known technology available for attaining the levels of
pollution deemed to be optimal in our model, the regulators are not obliged
to scale down that optimum so that it is consistent with current technology.
Instead, the regulators can simply impose fines on those firms which do
not or cannot, for technical reasons, comply with its regulations. As our
model suggests, the optimal amount of pollution will be attained. Some
firms will reduce their output and, thus, their fines; some will shut down
completely; and some will try to discover new and profitable techniques
57
which would allow lower levels of pollution at any given level of output.
Lastly, the court urged judicial deference stating that the enabling
legislation provided for a procedure to excuse a firm which could not
reasonably comply with the Board's regulations. This possibility of gaining a variance from the agency, the court felt, excused it from reexamining
the factual record in Board rulings:
Petitioner's concern that the Board's regulations may impose unreasonable economic burdens on specific polluters in the state was also
of concern to the legislature, as evidenced by the requirements of
[sections] 1035 and 1037. Those sections concern the granting of a
variance by the Board from its regulations, and they require specific
findings regarding economic reasonableness and individual hardship.
56. Id. This issue, whether a regulatory agency can, by its actions, create incentives for the
regulatees to discover a new technology in order to comply with the regulations, is known as
"technology forcing." It is frequently alleged to have been practiced by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency in its regulations establishing an average mile per gallon figure for the output of
domestic automobile manufacturers. When interim goals were first announced, the auto companies
complained that the technology to meet those goals was not known. The issue was whether the goals
could conceivably be met within the time allotted (if not, the auto companies would face onerous
fines, bankruptcy, or an increased reliance on imported cars by the noncomplying manufacturers),
or whether the automakers could, at reasonable cost, discover such suitable techniques. In any event,
the restrictions have been relaxed, and the manufacturers have found ingenious ways to increase the
gas mileage of their cars.
57. See supra Section II and note 21. The court recognized the point being made in the text; the
court continued to say that "the Board is not required to produce a record which discloses that a
substantial number of the polluters in the state can reasonably afford the cost and operation of the
requisite control equipment." 37 Il1.App. 3d at 274, 346 N.E.2d at 222. This view is economically
sound, as we have been arguing, but the court has not followed the implications of this thought.
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In the event that petitioner concludes that the Board's regulations
subject it to an unreasonable economic hardship, an appropriate resolution of this problem is provided for in the variance procedure.5"
The court in Shell Oilplainly did not view the opinion in Commonwealth
Edison charitably:
[W]hile professing to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, the First District [court in Commonwealth Edison], through
an extensive examination of the evidence, actually weighed the evidence in making its final determination ...

We believe that ...

the

very active role assumed by the First District is an inappropriate one
for review of administrative action which is in essence legislative in
character.59
The result of the Shell Oil decision has been that the courts in Illinois
firmly hold to judicial deference to administrative agency rulings first laid
out in Illinois Coal Operators'Association.The less rigid standard favored
in Commonwealth Edison can now be seen to have been a brief interlude.
There are no clear guidelines to determine which administrative procedures the courts will find arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The
Illinois Supreme Court did not lay out a standard in Illinois Coal Operators' Association, nor did it comment on the lower court's approach in
Commonwealth Edison. Nor has the high court of Illinois taken the opportunity to establish a standard of judicial review since Shell Oil or
comment on the lower court's actions in Shell Oil.
On the basis of this survey of cases it is not expected that the Illinois
courts will develop the economic efficiency interpretation for "economic
reasonableness" which we have urged in the previous section even though
the courts can establish the standard of economic efficiency for interpreting "economic reasonableness" which we have argued. For example,
as in Commonwealth Edison, the court could hold that calculations made
on any basis other than the one which we have previously urged are
arbitrary or unreasonable. However, it is not even clear that the courts
are the appropriate agent for interpreting "economic reasonableness."
Moreover, it appears to be true that the Pollution Control Board and the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency will not move to the economically defensible interpretation because of the specific wording of the
Illinois Waste Law. Without the intervention of the legislature there is
little hope that the law in Illinois dealing with the disposal of hazardous
waste will be interpreted in the way in which we have urged. As dem58. 37 I11.App. 3d at 274, 346 N.E.2d at 222.
59. Id. at 268,274, 346 N.E.2d at 218, 222.
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onstrated, this will inevitably lead to non-optimal landfill disposal of
hazardous wastes in the state of Illinois. 60
CONCLUSIONS
The disposal of hazardous wastes presents serious public policy problems. Most states deal with the potential risks to the environment and to
human health which result from landfilling wastes by adopting regulatory
measures which are more stringent and less flexible than those currently
in place for dealing with other environmental pollutants. Illinois' new
Hazardous Waste Law is no exception and is due to go into effect on
January 1, 1987. The Illinois Waste Law establishes a procedure for
determining whether to allow the landfilling of hazardous wastes on a
generator-by-generator basis. Illinois' statutes which empower the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency and the Pollution Control Board to
promulgate regulations on noise, ambient air, water, and other forms of
pollution have adopted a different method from that to be applied to the
landfilling of hazardous wastes. In all previous pollution statutes, the state
has instructed the administrative agency to proceed by establishing statewide standards for which variances can, under certain circumstances, be
granted. With regard to hazardous wastes, no statewide standards are to
be promulgated. Each instance of landfill is to be treated individually by
the regulators.
The more common statewide standard, the recently enacted generatorby-generator standard, and the standard of affordability do not achieve,
from the economic efficiency standpoint, the socially optimal amount of
60. The issues we have been discussing for the state of Illinois' attempts to enforce efficient
environmental regulation have also been the focus of some important, recent federal decisions. In
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), commonly
known as the Benzene Case, the Supreme Court was asked to decide if the criterion used by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in reducing the maximum allowable industrial exposure to benzene was constitutional. Since there was no majority opinion, merely a plurality, it is
not entirely clear what the decision stands for. The central issue was whether the administrative
agency should have used the criterion of technical feasibility, regardless of the financial consequences,
or that of cost-benefit analysis. A plurality of the justices avoided this issue, very much like those
we have been discussing, by holding that OSHA had not made the threshold showing that the then
currently allowable levels of benzene exposure posed a significant threat to the health of workers.
There is, however, dictum in the opinions which could reasonably lead one to believe that a majority
of the Court favors the cost-benefit criterion.
That the Court would favor that criterion over one of mere technical feasibility cannot now easily
be maintained after the Court's decision the next term in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan,
452 U.S. 490 (1981). The case involved OSHA's reduction in the maximum allowable exposure to
cotton dust in textile mills. OSHA here made the threshold showing that there was a significant
health risk in the then currently allowed exposure levels and went on to assert that the new, lower
standard, although very costly, was technically feasible. The Court agreed in an opinion which relied
heavily on statutory construction. The holding can perhaps be reconciled with the plurality dicta in
the Benzene Case by asserting that the administrative agency is entitled to the feasibility standard,
and no more, where toxic substances are involved.
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landfilling hazardous waste. This paper has discussed better methods of
minimizing the societal risks that arise from hazardous wastes. However,
if a choice must be made by policy makers from only these three standards-statewide standards with variances, standards set on a generatorby-generator basis, and affordability-then society's best interests are
served by adoption of the statewide standard. The potential inefficiencies
of that policy are less, and perhaps substantially less, than those of the
alternatives. The new Illinois Waste Law, by relying on an administrative
agency's developing standards on a generator-by-generator basis, can lead
to the imposition of more costs and fewer benefits on society than can
reasonably practical alternative policies.
We have examined the interpretation, by the Illinois courts, of the
phrase "economic reasonableness" in earlier pollution statutes in order
to see if the courts have been willing to interpret that phrase differently
from the manner in which the administrative agencies have interpreted
it. In Illinois, as is generally the case in every jurisdiction, the courts
defer to the agency except where the procedures used by the agency in
reaching its decision have been arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable. The courts, because of their deference to the administrative
agencies, cannot be looked to as the agent which will read the standard
of economic efficiency into pollution statutes which will help to achieve
the socially optimal amount of pollution. It would be a mistake, moreover,
for the courts to undertake to force the agencies to adopt that standard,
even if they could do so.
Thus, we conclude that public policy toward the landfilling of hazardous wastes must take a different path from that laid out in the Illinois
Waste Law. At a minimum, the law should be rewritten to compel the
regulators to establish statewide, rather than case-by-case, standards.

